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STOPPING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A MEMOIR 
LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1970s, I worked for Ralph Nader.  Among my projects was 
helping to stop utilities from building and operating nuclear power 
plants.  From our viewpoint, the plants were dangerous and held the 
potential for destroying lives, injuring people, and ruining vast swaths of 
American land.  The risks they posed led to massive citizen protests 
wherever utilities were investing in nuclear energy. 
Despite the highly visible nature of the controversy, very little 
literature chronicles this antinuclear movement.1  Although I played only 
a small role in it, I have wanted to offer my memories of that time, a 
time when citizen action contributed to a major societal shift. 
In the early 1950s, the promise of nuclear power seemed all but 
dead.  Utility companies feared the possibility of an atomic catastrophe 
and the inability to gain adequate insurance coverage for a major 
accident.  Yet, they continued to receive boundless encouragement to 
build from the federal government.  The bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki at the end of World War II, fear of nuclear power’s destructive 
power and perhaps guilt among those who had developed it led to the 
“Atoms for Peace” initiative during the Eisenhower years.2  One part of 
 
*Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  
 1. For the history of nuclear power during this time, see JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI, THE 
STATE OF NUCLEAR POWER: CONFLICT & CONTROL IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1984); 
STEVEN MARK COHN, TOO CHEAP TO METER: AN ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE NUCLEAR DREAM (1997); GEORGE T. MAZUZAN & J. SAMUEL WALKER, 
CONTROLLING THE ATOM: THE BEGINNINGS OF NUCLEAR REGULATION 1946-1962 (1984); 
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987).  For economic and 
technical analyses of nuclear power during that era, see RALPH NADER & JOHN ABBOTTS, 
THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY (1977); RON LANOUE, NUCLEAR PLANTS: THE MORE 
THEY BUILD, THE MORE YOU PAY (Center for the Study of Responsive Law 1977); WILLIAM 
C. WOOD, NUCLEAR SAFETY: RISKS AND REGULATION (1983).  For accounts of two specific 
controversies, see John G. FULLER, WE ALMOST LOST DETROIT (1975) (recounting the 1966 
partial meltdown at the Enrico Fermi plant near Toledo and Detroit); DONALD W. STEVER, 
JR., SEABROOK AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: THE LICENSING OF A 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (1980) (recounting the controversial licensing of the Seabrook plant 
in New Hampshire).  For a practical manual for citizens opposing nuclear plants, see SKIP 
LAITER, CITIZENS’ GUIDE TO NUCLEAR POWER (CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RESPONSIVE 
LAW 1975). 
2. See IRA CHERNUS, EISENHOWER’S ATOMS FOR PEACE (2002) (examining the 
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the promise of nuclear power was the claim by Lewis Strauss, the Chair 
of the Atomic Energy Commission that it would be very inexpensive, in 
fact, “too cheap to meter.”3 
In 1957, the Duquesne Light Company began operating the nation’s 
first nuclear plant in Shippingsport, Pennsylvania, near Pittsburgh.4  By 
1976, 60 nuclear plants were licensed to operate.5  Meanwhile, a popular 
antinuclear movement was growing. 
I became a participant in the movement when stopping nuclear 
power became one of my projects at work.  I drafted motions and 
rulemakings submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, edited 
extensive materials, wrote news releases, and spoke at conferences.  I 
found the experience exciting.  I was just a few years out of law school 
and able to play on the national level in a cause that pitted us against a 
clearly evil opponent. 
Moreover, I worked for the nation’s most prominent consumer 
advocate.  Ralph Nader dominated the public interest world. He was 
disciplined, knowledgeable, and most of all, charismatic like no one else.  
He could speak to an audience, talk way past his allotted time, and still 
hold the rapt attention of his listeners.  One could disagree with Ralph, 
but after talking with him, one could understand the merits of his 
position and leave inspired.  Because other advocates lacked his 
presence, they could not gain the visibility that he enjoyed.  As a result, 
his advocacy on this issue was invaluable. 
I particularly remember Ralph’s 1976 debate with MIT professor 
Norman Rasmussen at the National Press Club.6  Rasmussen had headed 
a $3 million government study concluding that nuclear power was safe.7  
Although Ralph certainly lacked Rasmussen’s technical expertise, he 
possessed detailed knowledge of the subject and also could persuasively 
emphasize his big theme: the Rasmussen study was defective, because it 
failed to consider such hazardous items as the aging of a plant, serious 
earthquakes, sabotage, terrorism, and human error.8  Ralph could hold 
his own. 
 
rhetoric and ideology of this policy agenda). 
3. See NADER & ABBOTTS, supra note 1, at 28-29. 
4. See Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, History, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-
preparedness/history.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (outlining history of Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s work on emergency response and preparedness). 
5. See BUPP & DERIAN, supra note 1, at 7. 
6. Ralph Nader & Norman Rasmussen, Addresses before the National Press Club (NPR 
radio broadcast June 1, 1976) (debating nation’s nuclear policy). 
7. See NADER & ABBOTS, supra note 1, at 119-22 (criticizing Rasmussen report); 
WOOD, supra note 1, at 41-43 (describing and critiquing Rasmussen’s Reactor Safety Study). 
8. See id.at 119-22 (outlining shortcomings of Rasmussen Report). 
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II. A CITIZENS MOVEMENT 
The antinuclear movement was truly a citizens movement.  
Although many of the members participated because they lived near a 
nuclear plant or near the site where a utility company had chosen to 
build one, other members also joined because they distrusted atomic 
energy.  A rally in Washington, D.C., could draw thousands as could 
national conferences.  Our monthly newspaper, “Critical Mass,” enjoyed 
a wide circulation.  In seven states, citizens placed initiatives on the 
ballot to stop or slow down the construction of nuclear plants.  Although 
the campaigns proved unsuccessful, they strengthened the grass roots 
efforts to challenge nuclear energy.  I admit to having misgivings about 
the initiatives; to my mind, some of the leaders lacked any political 
sophistication and were capable of doing more harm than good. 
Environmental causes can cross traditional political lines.  Many 
conservatives care deeply about the environment.  In those days, we 
often used the word “conservation” as opposed to “environmental,” for 
fear that the latter word could conjure up radical stereotypes and scare 
off potential supporters. 
Washington groups gave local citizens a stronger voice.  At home, 
they could do little more than protest at public hearings, hold small 
gatherings, and write letters to the local newspaper.  Few had the local 
counsel necessary to lodge legal challenges.  Yet, in Washington, we 
could address the powers that be with administrative filings, mass rallies, 
media coverage, and an occasional lawsuit.  Thus national and local 
groups worked hand in hand. 
For me, the intensity of citizen action was impressive.  Sometimes 
national groups are charged with claiming to represent a massive group 
of supporters, but really representing no one but themselves and a few 
financial contributors.  In this movement, however, massive support did 
exist.  It included people from all walks of life.  Many of them had 
schooled themselves in utility economics and became avid readers of 
“Public Utilities Fortnightly,” the leading trade magazine.  Their 
numbers also included serious scientists, members of the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, environmentalist Barry Commoner, and most 
prominently Harvard professors and Nobel Prize winners George Wald 
and Henry Kendall.  Members also included Australian-born pediatrician 
Helen Caldicott and the owner of a Florida supermarket.  The many 
entertainers who contributed included Jackson Browne and Joni 
Mitchell. 
SIRICO_DTP 2/19/2010  11:30:09 AM 
104 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXI: p. nnn 
III. THE ISSUES 
Although the questionable safety of nuclear plants held center stage, 
a number of related issues generated serious discussion, including waste 
disposal, the lack of sufficient insurance coverage, worker safety, 
inadequate evacuation plans, the presence of alternative energy sources, 
and the questionable financial wisdom of investing in nuclear power.9 
Waste disposal.  Even today, nuclear plants produce radioactive 
waste with long-term hazardous consequences.  For example, plutonium-
239 has a half-life of 24,000 years; that is, half of the radioactivity of a 
quantity will decay in 24,000 years.10  As of this writing, the 
government has yet to establish facilities for permanent disposal of high-
level waste.  Since the 1970s, the primary proposal has been for 
“geologic disposal,” that is, storing waste in a geologic formation so 
stable that the waste could not escape into the environment. 
An early candidate for a permanent disposal site was the salt domes 
near Lyons, Kansas.11  The presence of salt indicates a lack of 
groundwater that the waste could contaminate.  Salt also provides a 
radiation shield.  However, the government abandoned the proposal 
when it learned that the owners of a nearby salt mine had pumped water 
into their mine.  As a result, the high heat of the waste canisters would 
vaporize any water they contacted and expel steam water, salt, and 
radioactive waste.  The government later sought other suitable salt sites, 
but without success.  Most recently, the Department of Energy had 
proposed a site at Yucca Mountain, near Las Vegas, Nevada, as a 
permanent repository; however, political opposition and potential 
geological dangers have doomed the proposal.12 
Liabilty insurance.  Because the private insurance industry has 
been unwilling to write adequate liability policies for nuclear plants, 
Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Act,13 which continues to partially 
indemnify the industry.  This free insurance serves as a subsidy to the 
utility companies.  According to the Congressional Budget Office, it 
amounts to an annual subsidy of $600,000 to each reactor.14  Moreover 
 
9. See id. at 59-68 (providing overview issues arising in nuclear debate). 
10. See id. at 149 (providing background on environmental effects of nuclear waste). 
11. See id. at 153-54 (discussing the failure of this proposed solution). 
12. See David  M. Herszenhorn, Yucca Mountain Plan for Nuclear Waste Dies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009. 
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210;  see also UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMISSION, FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF FUNDS,  
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
2009) (explaining Price-Anderson Act). 
14. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 2986, NUCLEAR POWER’S ROLE IN GENERATING 
ELECTRICITY 29, Box 3-1 (2008) (assessing future viability of nuclear technology as domestic 
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it raises persistent questions: If nuclear power poses only the slightest 
risk of catastrophe, why will private insurance companies refuse to 
provide adequate coverage, and why does the industry need this 
insurance in the first place? 
Worker safety.  Worker safety has always been an issue.  Perhaps 
the story of Karen Silkwood, as portrayed in the 1983 motion picture 
“Silkwood,” has been the most dramatic.15  Silkwood worked as a lab 
technician at the Kerr-McGee nuclear facility near Crescent, Oklahoma 
where she made plutonium pellets for fuel rods.  A union activist, she 
publicly complained about lax safety procedures at the plant and was 
one of the many workers contaminated by plutonium.  On November 13, 
1974, she drove to Oklahoma City to meet with a union leader and a 
New York Times reporter to give them a folder of documents that would 
support her claim that Kerr-McGee had falsified records on quality 
controls.  Later that night, Silkwood was found dead in what appeared to 
be a single-car accident.  However, her folder was never found.  
Controversy arose over whether she fell asleep at the wheel or was 
forced off the road by another car.  After considerable litigation, Kerr-
McGee settled with the Silkwood family for $1.38 million, but admitted 
no liability. 
I had some involvement in an incident concerning worker safety.  In 
1975, a New Mexico state official telephoned the Freedom of 
Information Clearinghouse, a part of Nader’s Center for the Study of 
Responsive Law, to seek information on how to conceal information 
about contaminated water at uranium mines in the western part of that 
state.  When the Clearinghouse attorney explained that his group was 
concerned about making information public and not suppressing it, the 
official hung up.  Further investigation disclosed that the drinking water 
for the miners and their families was dangerously contaminated and not 
even acceptable as treated waste water.  I handled media coverage of the 
story and helped it become the subject of an article on page 2 of the 
Washington Post (no mean feat).  I must have played a larger role in 
investigating the incident, but cannot recall what it might have been. 
Emergency planning.  Under current regulations of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, utilities must give “reasonable assurance that 
adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 
radiological emergency.”16  These regulations require defining 
emergency planning zones.  The first zone includes the area within a ten 
mile radius of the plant, the “plume exposure pathway,” in which 
 
energy source). 
15. SILKWOOD (MGM 1983). 
16. 10 C.F.R. pt. 50.47(a)(1)(i). 
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individuals could encounter direct radiation exposure.17  The second 
zone includes the “ingestion pathway,” the area within a fifty mile radius 
in which radioactivity could contaminate water, food crops, and 
livestock.18 
Even with these arguably conservative estimates, evacuating people 
from these areas would seem highly impractical.  According to Dr. 
Samuel Epstein, professor emeritus at the University of Chicago School 
of Public Health, “About 80 million Americans in 37 states live within 
40 miles of a nuclear reactor, including residents of New York City, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Miami, Phoenix, Cleveland, and 
Boston.”19  He states, “If a meltdown were to occur, safe evacuation 
would be impossible and many thousands would suffer from radiation 
poisoning or cancer.”20 
The futility of evacuation plans has long been a concern in the anti-
nuclear movement.  I remember it first arising when Maine Public 
Interest Research Group, a student organization, criticized the 
problematic emergency plan put forth by the Maine Yankee Atomic 
Power Company with respect to its Maine Yankee plant in the early 
1970s. 
Alternative energy.  In the 1970s, “alternative energy” meant solar 
energy.  Wind power barely received a mention as did obtaining energy 
from biomass.  Certainly environmental groups were advocating these 
methods; however, their viability seemed problematic to many.21  Utility 
companies had no interest in promoting these alternatives.  While the 
companies could convert to nuclear generated power by modifying their 
existing technology for generating energy out of fossil fuel, they could 
not employ this technology to harness solar power.  Solar power 
permitted individual users to generate their own electricity.  Thus, solar 
power was an economic threat to the utility industry. 
Because alternative energy sources seemed so futuristic, 
environmental groups sometimes were forced to argue that clean coal 
plants were eminently feasible; desulfurization equipment (scrubbers) 
would satisfy air quality standards, and the true cost of nuclear energy 
would not be much greater than coal energy.  As part of its public 
relations strategy in opposition to these arguments, the nuclear industry 
 
17. Id. pt. 50.47(c)(1)(iii)(B)(2). 
18. Id. 
19. Push for New Nuclear Power Sputters, But Old Reactors Still Pose Cancer Risks 
(July 27, 2009), available at http://world-wire.com/news/0907270001.html (discussing effort 
to block legislation permitting further development of nuclear power plants). 
20. Id. (discussing health risks of living near nuclear reactors) 
21. See NADER & ABBOTTS, supra note 1, at 30 (describing solar energy as an “ugly 
duckling,” as far as the energy industry perceived it). 
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created a simple electronic game for school children that let them 
calculate how to produce enough energy for society.  In choosing among 
different amounts of coal, oil, and nuclear energy, the students would 
conclude that the future required a considerable amount of nuclear 
power. 
Financing nuclear power.  Antinuclear groups have always found 
a strong argument in emphasizing the enormous expense of constructing, 
running and decommissioning nuclear plants.  The plants cost more to 
build than fossil fuel plants, the cost of uranium rose, and the plants 
often encountered problems that forced them out of service and 
compelled the utilities to purchase energy elsewhere.  Moreover, at the 
end of the plant’s life, the plant must be decommissioned by mothballing 
the plant, entombing it in concrete, or dismantling it.  The Fort St. Vrain 
plant in Colorado was the first commercial nuclear plant to undergo 
decommissioning; the process was completed after six years in 1996 at 
an expenditure of $188 million.22 
In the 1960s and 1970s, cost analyses were the products of utility 
companies, vendors of reactors, and government agencies, and therefore 
tended to be quite optimistic.23  As a result gigantic cost overruns 
became common.  By the 1980s, even an article in business-oriented 
Forbes was pointing a finger of blame: 
The failure of the U.S. nuclear power program ranks as the 
largest managerial disaster in business history, a disaster on a 
monumental scale.  The utility industry has already invested 
$125 billion in nuclear power, with an additional $140 billion to 
come before the decade is out, and only the blind, or the biased, 
can now think that most of the money has been well spent.  It is 
a defeat for the U.S. consumer and for the competitiveness of 
U.S. industry, for the utilities that undertook the program and 
for the private enterprise system that made it possible.24 
All these arguments were easy for the public to grasp and thus 
fueled the fires of discontent.  Moreover, they were easy enough for us 
 
22. See ROGER DUNSTAN, BENEFITS AND RISKS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN CALIFORNIA 
39 (California Research Bureau, April 2002), available at  
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/02/08/02-008.pdf (outlining risks and benefits of nuclear energy 
production in California) 
23. See MARK COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS: RENAISSANCE OR 
RELAPSE? 2 (2009), available at  
http://www.nirs.org/neconomics/cooperreport_neconomics062009.pdf (wading into nuclear 
policy debate). 
24. James Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at cover, quoted in COOPER, 
supra note 23, at 13 (presenting misgivings over level of expenditures made by nuclear 
industry). 
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to master.  With access to a few experts, we quickly became capable of 
speaking, writing, and lobbying effectively.  I think some utility 
executives understood that the arguments had considerable truth to them 
and generated at least some misgivings about the industry position.  Yet, 
when an executive makes a commitment to a dubious endeavor and 
effectively ties his or her future to its success, admitting a mistake 
becomes exceedingly difficult and may amount to professional suicide.  
This conflict may explain some angry outbursts by executives who 
attended our conferences. 
I have also wondered about a particular energy lobbyist who 
sometimes attended our events.  He sported very long hair and a beard, 
probably so that we would think he was a child of the 1960s and 
trustworthy.  His sole task seemed to be to talk before the television 
cameras and state that he had worked for the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and that nuclear power was safe.  I never saw him look 
anything but grimly serious.  I am willing to bet that he hated his job. 
IV. THE DEMISE OF NUCLEAR POWER 
By 1976, 60 reactors stood completed with 146 more either under 
construction or on order.25  During the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
utilities ordered 240 nuclear reactors.26  However, they eventually 
canceled half these orders and in building the rest, encountered dramatic 
cost overruns.27  The demand for new reactors stopped abruptly with the 
last order occurring in 1976. 
Reflecting on the end of the nuclear decade, economist Charles 
Komanoff identified “ten blows that stopped nuclear power”: (1) the 
1973 Arab Oil Embargo, which weakened the economy, reduced the use 
of electricity, destroyed the financial ability of utilities to order new 
plants, and made the public suspicious of corporate America; (2) India’s 
detonation of its first atomic bomb, which raised fears that nuclear 
power opened the path to manufacturing nuclear weapons, led the 
government to slow the development of plutonium fields, thus increasing 
the cost of uranium; (3) in 1975, the replacing of the Atomic Energy 
Commission with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which moved 
nuclear regulation to a more safety-conscious agency whose regulations 
increased the costs of producing nuclear power; (4) the 1975 fire at the 
 
25. See BUPP & DERIAN, supra note 1, at 7. 
26. See COOPER, supra note 23, at 33 (outlining history of nuclear power in United 
States). 
27. Id. (providing historical overview of development of domestic nuclear 
development). 
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Browns Ferry plant in Alabama where workers used candles to find 
leaks in insulation, which almost caused a meltdown and did cause the 
shutdown of two generators for nineteen months; (5) the resignation of 
three managers in General Electric’s nuclear engineering division who 
then became experts for the anti-nuclear movement; (6) the writings of 
physicist-environmentalist Amory Lovins which distinguished between 
“hard energy paths” and “soft energy paths,” with the latter employing 
decentralized energy sources, renewable sources, and conservation 
technologies; (7) the 1977 Seabrook, New Hampshire protest in which 
18,000 non-violent protestors occupied the proposed site of a plant and 
encouraged grassroots activism across the country; (8) the 1979 partial 
meltdown at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania, which exposed 
shocking lapses in regulation and challenged any public trust in the 
safety of nuclear plants as well as demonstrating the impracticality of 
plant evacuation plans; (9) the tightening of the money supply in 1979, 
followed by back-to-back recessions, which diminished the growth of 
energy demand and led to the cancellation of dozens of plants; and (10) 
the admission by Pacific Gas & Electric that it had inadvertently 
disabled the earthquake protection systems at the California Diablo 
Canyon reactors which were near seismic fault lines, thus embarrassing 
the industry and ended efforts to streamline the process of licensing 
reactors.28 
Komanoff omits the Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union 
and other later events, because he believes that the growth of nuclear 
power had ceased before they occurred.29  According to Komanoff, “the 
mark of activists is evident in all ten blows, and, indeed, in the entire 
quarter-century withering of nuclear power.”30  He writes, 
Only a mass movement could engender a social fabric and a 
political context in which the dangers of nuclear power could be 
made manifest, in which necessary and costly reactor 
safeguards could be made mandatory, in which protest and 
resistance could be nurtured, and in which alternatives could be 
legitimized.31 
At the end of the 1933 movie “King Kong,” impresario Carl 
Denham proclaims, “It was beauty killed the beast.”32  As for nuclear 
 
28. See Charles Komanoff, 10 Blows That Stopped Nuclear Power, 
http://www.komanoff.net/nuclear_power/10_blows.php (setting forth prominent events 
contributing to waning public support for nuclear energy). 
29. Id. (stating why Chernobyl disaster does not appear on list). 
30. Id. (discussing success of anti-nuclear movement). 
31. Id. (outlining effectiveness of anti-nuclear movement). 
32. KING KONG (RKO Radio Pictures 1933). 
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power, it succumbed because it fell for the false beauty of the promise of 
profitable, yet inexpensive energy that concealed hazards and financial 
costs.  In the end, nuclear power proved a financial disaster.  Yet, it took 
the action of concerned citizens to unmask this failure and hasten demise 
of the nuclear era.  I am glad that I had the chance to be part of that 
effort. 
 
